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1 Introduction
During the recent ﬁnancial crisis policy makers around the world have turned their
attention to state ownership of banks. Ironically as recently as a decade ago there was
an apparent consensus in favour of bank privatisation, and governments in developing
countries were compelled to divest a signiﬁcant proportion of the equity of the state-
owned banks. This was seen as a cure for non-performing assets, a chronic problem that
was associated with public sector banks. But in a dramatic reversal of fortune, it is now
the private sector banks that are at the centre stage of recent meltdown and have even
been blamed in the media for their pursuit of proﬁt. While economists are divided in
their prescription for a solution, policy makers have rushed to bail out distressed private
banks, and even (signiﬁcantly) nationalised many of them. One immediate beneﬁt of
nationalisation is recapitalisation. But how will it aﬀect bank competition in the deposit
market and in the loan market? The banking literature has studied issues ranging from
ﬁnancial contagion (Allen and Gale, 2000), bank runs and liquidity crisis (Smith, 1991;
Diamond and Rajan, 2005), to competition and risk-shifting (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005);
but it has mainly considered interactions among private banks, and therefore may not
be adequately helpful in understanding the outcome of emerging competition between
public and private banks. This paper studies the outcome of bank competition in the
context of nationalisation. Speciﬁcally we show that if credit risk is suﬃciently high and
there is limited liability, then a nationalised bank would try to protect depositors from
potential losses by mobilising less deposit leading to contraction of industry deposit.
There is a separate body of work in industrial organisation known as mixed oligopoly
that exclusively studies competition between public and private ﬁrms (De Fraja and
Delbono, 1989; Matsumura, 1998). The underlying view of mixed competition is that
state ownership provides an indirect means of regulating the conduct of private ﬁrms
using market instruments rather than using administrative-judicial interventions like
the US Anti-trust system. A general result of this literature is that the publicly owned
ﬁrm will act more aggressively and have greater market share than the private ﬁrms; but
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social welfare may not always rise, though in most cases will, especially if the public ﬁrm’s
degree of state ownership is optimally chosen. Our aim is to adapt the mixed oligopoly
approach to bank competition and see how state ownership aﬀects bank interactions.
There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between banks and ordinary ﬁrms. In the industrial
organisation literature ﬁrms mainly interact in the output market and have no or little
interactions in the input market. Banks, on the other hand, have to interact in both the
deposit (input) market, and the loan (output) market; moreover by lending to each other
they add another dimension to their relationship. Above all, unlike ordinary ﬁrms banks
have to deal with credit risk e.g. loan default risk and its knock-on eﬀects on diﬀerent
aspects of the banking business. In this paper we explicitly allow for such features which
distinguish banks from standard non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that are studied in the industrial
organisation literature.
Apart from the above-mentioned theoretical issues, there are good empirical reasons
as to why banking should be modeled using the mixed oligopoly approach. Despite
wide spread banking deregulation, entry of private and foreign banks has by and large
remained a subject of state control in many countries. In fact, state presence is a common
feature in banking systems all over the world. See Barth et al (2001) for evidence on
EU countries, Sherif et al (2003) for transition economies and Shirai (2002) for China
and India. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that the banking industry in many
economies (especially emerging) resembles mixed oligopoly with strategic interactions
among banks occurring at many dimensions. There have been only a few articles that
have considered mixed ownership or non-proﬁt maximizing behavior of banks. Purroy
and Salas (2000) studied competition between a private bank and a savings institution,
and Saha and Sensarma (2004) between a private bank and a public bank. Both articles
have demonstrated that the mixed duopoly approach can be useful; but they share a
common limitation of focussing only on deposit competition and not credit risk, which
we aim to overcome in this paper.
In modeling public banks, our ﬁrst hurdle is to deﬁne the objective of a public bank.
Following the mixed oligopoly literature we assume that it maximises social welfare,
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which is the sum of the payoﬀs earned by all participants in the banking industry, which
principally are banks’ shareholders, borrowers (who are essentially entrepreneurs seeking
funds for risky projects) and depositors. But by no means is this the only possibility.
One can add other objectives, speciﬁcally linked to loan or deposit market, that might
better describe the circumstances and motivation for state intervention in a particular
country.
Throughout our analysis we will consider only a duopoly setup. We model deposit
competition between a partially state-owned bank and a private bank. We introduce
a loan market and allow uncertainty in the form of default risk. The government’s
objective in this model is entirely social welfare maximisation and the private bank is
a proﬁt-maximiser. Both banks have equity capital along with deposit liabilities. We
ﬁrst consider the case where the banks bear the entire risk; they pay depositors the
due amount, even if the borrowers have defaulted. In this case the public bank acts
aggressively, and this leads to greater deposit mobilisation. Then we introduce limited
liability, which essentially puts the depositors at risk; if borrowers default, depositors lose
money as banks (like their borrowers) are protected by limited liability. We show that
the public bank in this case takes into account the depositors’ loss, and if the default risk
is signiﬁcant it will act conservatively and collect less deposits. Though this will beneﬁt
the private bank in their deposit mobilisation, aggregate deposits can fall below the pure
duopoly level (which corresponds to the case of competition between two private banks).
This result is quite opposite to what standard mixed duopoly models predict.
Standard mixed duopoly models, which usually focus on output competition, predict
more aggressive behaviour of the public ﬁrm largely because it puts a positive weight
on social welfare, and in the usual way greater output leads to greater welfare. This
argument largely holds for bank competition as well, if depositors do not face any risk
(due to either lack of limited liability or complete deposit insurance). But as has been
seen in recent crises, limited liability on the part of the entrepreneur-borrowers and
banks put depositors at risk. A social welfare oriented public bank takes into account
the potential loss that depositors might face when default occurs. If this risk is not small,
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the public bank will try to restrict its deposit mobilisation below a proﬁt-maximizing
level. The overall outcome may be a contraction of total deposits.
Our result can be related to a well established literature that has studied the eﬀect
of competition on risk taking. Both the theoretical and empirical results are mixed,
though policy makers tend to believe that competition has destabilising eﬀects on risk-
taking by the bankers. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) provide an overview of this literature,
and argues that the negative view of competition is largely based on the theories that
consider mainly single market interactions, viz. the deposit market (see also Hellman et
al, 2000). If a loan market is introduced, they argue, bank competition will reduce the
interest rate on loans and thus reduce the risk of default. In our paper, the state owned
bank has a similar eﬀect on aggregate deposit as competition does in a setup of private
banks. We show that if the probability of default is below a critical level, then the Boyd
and De Nicolo (2005) type of positive eﬀect emerges, but if the probability of default is
above this critical level, then the negative eﬀects may dominate.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of deposit competition
with default risk in the lending side. In section 3 we consider the benchmark case of
unlimited liability where the depositors are not exposed to the eﬀects of credit risk.
Section 4 explores the case of limited liability, which shifts the risk onto depositors.
Here we derive our main results on the eﬀects of state ownership. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The public bank is indexed 0, and the private bank indexed 1. Depositors earn interest
rate 푟퐷 by the following rule
푟퐷 = 푏(퐷0 +퐷1), 푏 > 0.
The public bank is jointly owned by the government and a private partner, and the
choice of the volume of deposit is made by the bank’s board of management consisting
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of a government representative and the private partner. It maximises the following
objective function
푍 = 휃푆푊 + (1− 휃)휋0. (1)
where 휃 (휃 ∈ [0, 1]) is the degree of public ownership.1 The resultant deposit choice gives
rise to the public bank’s reaction function.
There is an alternative approach to public ﬁrm suggested by Fershtman (1990), in
which the same weights (휃 and (1−휃)) can be applied to a fully public bank’s and a fully
private bank’s reaction function to arrive at the partially public ﬁrm’s reaction function.
Saha and Sensarma (2004) followed this approach. Both approaches oﬀer qualitatively
similar conclusions. In fact, Kumar and Saha (2008) have shown that both approaches
are formally equivalent.
The private bank’s manager chooses 퐷1 to maximise 휋1. The manager’s choice of
퐷1 gives the private bank’s deposit reaction function.
We now introduce a loan market where the interest rate is determined by the following
loan demand curve 푟퐿 = 푐¯ − 푐퐿, 푐 > 0, where 퐿 is the total loans made. The banks
give out loans from not only the deposits raised but also from equity (퐸) raised from
the capital market. Total lending by a bank equals the sum of deposits and shareholder
equity, i.e. 퐿 = 퐷 +퐸. Left to themselves the shareholders might not put in enough of
their own funds into the bank leading to a highly leveraged bank (where the leverage ratio
is 퐷/퐿). Therefore, through capital regulation the regulator has to enforce a minimum
level of shareholder equity (Milne, 2006). Let 훾 be the capital to asset ratio imposed
by the regulator (similar to risk weighted capital adequacy ratio e.g. 8 % under Basel-I
norms) such that 훾 = 퐸/퐿. We can then rewrite the balance sheet equality as 퐿 = 푘퐷
where 푘 = 11−훾 .
We also assume that the entrepreneur-borrowers face uncertainty in the realisation
of the value of their project. There are two states of nature: good and bad. The good
state occurs with probability 푝1 and bad state with probability 푝2. In the good state the
1While the ownership exceeds 50 percent is very important, it cannot be denied that any
change in 휃 will have some eﬀect on the bank behavior.
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borrowers are able to pay back both principal and interest, but in the bad state they
pay back nothing. However, the bank can liquidate the ﬁrm and recover the principal,
but the interest is lost. Alternatively the borrowing can be assumed to be collateralised.
In the bad state, as the bank loses interest earnings, its ability to repay the depositors is
aﬀected. The depositors get back the principal, but lose out on the interest payments.
However, since the bank has equity (푘 > 1) it will be able to meet the interest obligations
to the extent it has funds. Thus, the depositors stand to lose in the bad state. Note
that if there is complete deposit insurance or if the banks are suﬃciently capitalised (푘
large) then the depositors do not lose. But we do not consider deposit insurance here
and instead allow the depositors to bear the risk by allowing limited liability on the part
of the banks and entrepreneur-borrowers.2
3 Bank competition: Unlimited liability case
As a benchmark case we consider here deposits as debt obligations that are honored in
all states of nature.
Bank 푖 lends 퐿푖(= 푘퐷푖) and earns at the end of the year
퐸휋푖 = 푝1 [(1 + 푟퐿)푘퐷푖 − (1 + 푟퐷)퐷푖] + 푝2 [푘퐷푖 − (1 + 푟퐷)퐷푖] ,
=
[
푘˜ − 훿˜(퐷0 +퐷1)
]
퐷푖, (2)
where 푘˜ = 푘 − 1 + 푝1푘푐¯ and 훿˜ = 푝1푘2푐+ 푏. Sum of the two banks’ expected proﬁts is
퐸휋 = 퐸휋0 + 퐸휋1 =
[
푘˜ − 훿˜(퐷0 +퐷1)
]
(퐷0 +퐷1). (3)
From the area under the positively sloping deposit supply curve, we ﬁnd the surplus that
2Exogenously given schemes of deposit insurance can be introduced in our framework without
much complications. But in principle the insurer should be allowed to monitor the behaviors of
the banks, which is a non-trivial exercise and we do not pursue it here.
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depositors expect to enjoy
퐸[퐷푆] = 푟퐷(퐷0 +퐷1)− 푏(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
= 푏
(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
. (4)
We have another group - entrepreneur-borrowers - whose expected surplus, based on
the negatively sloping loan demand curve, is
퐸[퐵푆] = 푝1
[
푐¯푘(퐷0 +퐷1)− 푐푘2 (퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
− 푟퐿푘(퐷0 +퐷1)
]
,
= 푝1푘
2푐
(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
. (5)
Expected social welfare of this economy is then deﬁned as 푆푊 = 퐸휋 + 퐸[퐷푆] +
퐸[퐵푆]. Adding equations (3), (4) and (5) we get
퐸[푆푊 ] =
[
푘˜ − 훿˜ (퐷0 +퐷1)
2
]
(퐷0 +퐷1). (6)
The public bank pursues an objective function 푍 = 휃퐸[푆푊 ] + (1 − 휃)퐸휋0, where
휃 is the degree of public ownership. Maximizing 푍 we derive the public bank’s deposit
reaction function as
퐷0 =
푘˜
(2− 휃)훿˜ −
퐷1
2− 휃 .
Similarly, the private bank’s reaction function is
퐷1 =
푘˜
2훿˜
− 퐷0
2
.
The reaction curves of the two banks are shown in ﬁgure 1. Two thick curves, denoted
as 푅퐹0 and 푅퐹1 are drawn with the assumption that 휃 ∈ (0, 1). The downward slopes
indicate that the deposits are strategic substitutes.
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Figure 1: Deposit reaction functions: unlimited liability
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If the private bank chooses zero deposit, the public bank will choose its monopoly
deposit as 푘˜
훿˜(2−휃) , and similarly, if the public bank chooses zero deposit the private
bank’s manager will choose 퐷1 =
푘˜
2훿˜
. Conversely, if the private bank chooses 퐷1 =
푘˜
훿˜
,
the public bank will simply close down, and similarly, the public bank’s choice of 퐷0 =
푘˜
훿˜
will force the private bank to close down. Thus, the monopoly and entry-deterring levels
of deposits of each bank can be deﬁned in the usual way as quantity setting ﬁrms’ outputs
are deﬁned. The equilibrium deposits are given by point 푀 comprising of 퐷∗0 and 퐷∗1,
which we obtain as
퐷0 =
푘˜
훿˜(3− 2휃) , (7)
퐷1 =
푘˜(1− 휃)
훿˜(3− 2휃) . (8)
The aggregate deposit in this model is
퐷표 +퐷1 =
푘˜(2− 휃)
훿˜(3− 2휃) .
It can be readily checked that both the public bank’s deposit and aggregate deposit are
increasing in the degree of nationalisation. On the other hand, the private bank’s deposit
is decreasing in the degree of nationalisation. In fact, when 휃 = 0 and both banks were
proﬁt-maximizers we would have a pure (or equivalently private) duopoly. The public
bank’s reaction curve would then swing inward and we have the Cournot deposits as
퐷0 = 퐷1 =
푘˜
3훿˜
. This is given by point 푁 in ﬁgure 1. Since point 푀 lies South-East of
point 푁 , it is clear that the mixed duopoly generates greater deposit for the public bank
but lower deposit for the private bank than the private duopoly.
At the other extreme, when the public bank is fully public, 휃 = 1, the private bank’s
deposit is reduced to zero (point O in ﬁgure 1). This is the case where the public
bank crowds out the private bank, a phenomenon commonly occurring mixed oligopoly
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models.3
In this case, when debt obligations are honored in all states of nature the standard
results of mixed duopoly models continue to hold, in which the public bank acts more
aggressively (in raising deposits) and the private bank acts more defensively. In other
words, the standard proﬁt-shifting motive of public ownership continues to hold even
if there are some states of nature forcing defaults. It can also be checked that if the
government was to choose optimal privatisation, it would choose 휃 = 1. Total deposit
under optimal (zero) privatisation would be 퐷0 =
푘˜
3훿˜
and the expected proﬁt of the
public bank will be zero. That is, its expected loss in the bad state would be equal to
its expected proﬁt in the good state. The private bank is driven out of business.
We summarise the above results from the no limited liability case in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 When debt obligations are always honoured by banks, the public bank
acts more aggressively than the private bank, i.e. 퐷0 > 퐷1. Moreover the public bank’s
deposit and aggregate deposit will increase with the degree of nationalisation while the
private bank’s deposit will fall. That is, ∂퐷0∂휃 > 0,
∂퐷
∂휃 > 0 and
∂퐷1
∂휃 < 0.
4 Bank competition: Limited liability case
Now we assume that the banks are insuﬃciently capitalised, so that in the bad state
they cannot meet their full obligations. This will be the case if 푘 = 1 or 푘 is slightly
greater than 1, or the bank is not able to recover the full amount of the principal from
the entrepreneurs. For simplicity we will assume that the full amount of the principal is
recovered, but 푘 is not large enough to cover the interest charges payable to the depositors
in the equilibrium. Due to limited liability, depositors get back what is available with
3However, in standard mixed oligopoly models for this to happen constant marginal cost is
required. In our banking model, neither the marginal return curve nor the marginal cost curve is
constant. But on both dimensions they depend on aggregate deposits. This is a crucial feature
of banks, as opposed to standard ﬁrm.
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the bank, 푘퐷, when 푘퐷 < (1 + 푟퐷)퐷. Since 푟퐷 increases with the total deposit 퐷, it
is quite possible that the depositors may not lose at all if the total deposit is not large
relative to 푘. That is, if 푘 > (1 + 푟퐷) then even in the bad state the depositors are safe.
For our story to hold, we need to focus on the case where 푘 < (1 + 푟퐷).
Under limited liability banks’ expected proﬁt is given only by the good state.
퐸휋푖 = 푝1 [(1 + 푟퐿)푘퐷푖 − (1 + 푟퐷)퐷푖] ,
= 푝1 [푘
∗ − 훿(퐷0 +퐷1)]퐷푖, (9)
where 푘∗ = 푘 − 1 + 푘푐¯ and 훿 = 푘2푐+ 푏.
From the above one gets the aggregate expected proﬁts as
퐸휋 = 퐸휋0 + 퐸휋1 = 푝1 [푘
∗ − 훿(퐷0 +퐷1)] (퐷0 +퐷1). (10)
The depositors now stand to lose in the bad state. Their surplus is
퐸[퐷푆] = 푝1(1 + 푟퐷)(퐷0 +퐷1) + 푝2푘(퐷0 +퐷1)−퐷 − 푏(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
,
=
[
1
2
푝1푏(퐷0 +퐷1) + 푝2(푘 − 1)− 푝2푏(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
]
(퐷0 +퐷1). (11)
Note that with the restriction 푘퐷 < (1 + 푏퐷)퐷 or 푘 − 1 < 푏(퐷0 +퐷1), (so that limited
liability applies) 퐸[퐷푆] is now strictly less than 푏 (퐷0+퐷1)
2
2 , which was the expected
depositor surplus under the ‘no limited liability’ case.
The expected borrower surplus remains unchanged from equation (5). Adding the
expressions in (5), (10), and (11) we derive the expected social welfare as
퐸[푆푊 ] = 푝1
[
푘∗ − 훿 (퐷0 +퐷1)
2
]
(퐷0 +퐷1) + 푝1푏
(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
+ 푝2(퐷0 +퐷1)(푘 − 1)− 푏(퐷0 +퐷1)
2
2
. (12)
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Following the same procedure as before we get the following two reaction functions
퐷0 =
푝1푘
∗ + 휃푝2(푘 − 1)
푝1훿(2− 휃) + 휃푝2푏 −
[푝1훿 + 휃푝2푏]
푝1훿(2− 휃) + 휃푝2푏퐷1, (13)
퐷1 =
푘∗
2훿
− 퐷0
2
. (14)
Solving the above system of equations we get the following Cournot-Nash deposits
퐷0 =
푝1푘
∗훿 + 휃푝2 {(푘 − 1)2훿 − 푏푘∗}
훿 [푝1훿(3− 2휃) + 휃푝2푏] , (15)
퐷1 =
푝1푘
∗훿(1− 휃) + 휃푝2 {푏푘∗ − (푘 − 1)훿}
훿 [푝1훿(3− 2휃) + 휃푝2푏] , (16)
These result in the aggregate deposit
퐷표 +퐷1 =
푝1푘
∗(2− 휃) + 휃푝2(푘 − 1)
푝1훿(3− 2휃) + 휃푝2푏 .
At this point we can make the following observations. Neither 퐷0 nor 퐷1 are un-
conditionally monotonic in 휃. In particular, it is striking that even if 휃 = 1, the private
bank’s deposit does not become zero. It remains strictly positive. More importantly,
the aggregate deposit under the mixed duopoly (with the public bank being fully pub-
lic) may not necessarily be greater than that under pure duopoly. If both banks were
privately owned (i.e. 휃 = 0), aggregate deposit is
퐷(휃 = 0) =
2푘∗
3훿
.
With full public ownership in the public bank, aggregate deposit is
퐷(휃 = 1) =
푝1푘
∗ + 푝2(푘 − 1)
푝1훿 + 푝2푏
.
By comparing these expressions and individual deposits of the banks we arrive at the
following result.
Proposition 2 If 푝2 >
훿푘∗
푘(3훿푐¯−2푘∗푘푐) , aggregate deposit under full public ownership of
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the public bank will be less than the aggregate deposit under pure duopoly. That is,
퐷(휃 = 1) < 퐷(휃 = 0); moreover, 퐷0(휃 = 1) < 퐷0(휃 = 0) = 퐷1(휃 = 0) < 퐷1(휃 = 1). On
the other hand, if 푝2 <
훿푘∗
푘(3훿푐¯−2푘∗푘푐) , we have 퐷(휃 = 0) < 퐷(휃 = 1), and 퐷1(휃 = 1) <
퐷0(휃 = 0) = 퐷1(휃 = 0) < 퐷0(휃 = 1).
One implication of proposition 2 is that when the likelihood of the bad state is above
a critical level, the depositors’ loss matters a lot and the publicly owned bank collects
deposit very conservatively. However, this defensive act encourages the private bank to
increase its deposit, because the two banks’ deposits are strategic substitutes. However,
the aggregate deposit falls short of the fully private or pure duopoly level and thus the
depositors’ loss is restricted to an optimal level. On the other hand, if the bad state is
less likely then the government social welfare maximisation objective encourages its bank
to mobilise greater deposits and the market is expanded well beyond the pure duopoly
level. In the latter case, we have a similar outcome as if there was no uncertainty. But in
the former case, public ownership leads to a contraction in the market, quite in contrast
to standard mixed duopoly models.
We may relate this to the ﬁnding of Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) where greater
competition reduces default risk by lowering the cost of borrowing (as the loan rate falls)
and also by making more low-risk-low-proﬁt projects viable. But our model suggests that
this ﬁnding may not hold unconditionally. Though we considered only exogenous risk,
it can be argued that in the presence of a public bank, results can go either way. If
the default risk is signiﬁcant, then the public bank’s conservative approach will lead
to a contraction in total loans causing interest rate to rise. In the view of Boyd and
De Nicolo then entrepreneurs will shift to more risky projects. If we allow endogenous
default probability, we will be able to see how the public bank reacts and how the
government’s choice of public ownership is aﬀected.
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5 Conclusion
This paper explores partial nationalisation and credit risk in the framework of a ‘mixed
oligopoly’. We show that if there is no limited liability or if there is complete deposit
insurance, then in the event of loan default the banks loses money, but depositors remain
safe. But the banks’ loss is equal to depositors’ gain. Therefore, in terms of social welfare
this loss does not matter. The public bank acts aggressively and mobilises greater
deposits leading to an expansion of aggregate deposits, though in the process the private
bank’s operation is squeezed. This is very much in line with the predictions of standard
mixed duopoly models. But if the banks are protected by limited liability and deposits
are only partially insured, then depositors are exposed to risk, and they cannot pass on
this risk to anybody else. Therefore, in the social welfare calculations the expected loss
of the depositors matters. The public bank takes into account this loss, and changes
its behaviour in the following way. If the default risk is signiﬁcant, it will mobilise less
deposits resulting in a contraction of aggregate deposits, though the private bank will
be able to proﬁt from this defensive act. Essentially, the public bank will try to borrow
less and lend less. This is a reversal of the standard mixed duopoly result. However, if
the risk of default is small, the public bank returns to aggressive competition.
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Appendix
Detailed derivation of proposition 1
It is straightforward to compare 퐷푂 and 퐷1 from equations (7) and (8) and conclude
that 퐷0 > 퐷1.
Next, we derive the following expressions:
∂퐷0
∂휃 =
2
(3−2휃)2 > 0.
∂퐷1
∂휃 = − 1(3−2휃)2 < 0.
∂퐷
∂휃 =
1
(3−2휃)2 > 0.
Detailed derivation of proposition 2
We demonstrate the results graphically. Consider ﬁgure 2 where the deposit reaction
functions of the two banks under limited liability are plotted under the assumption that
the probability of default is above the critical level. While the equilibrium deposits
are given by point 푀 as before, our interest is in comparing this with the case when
휃 = 1. This is indicated by the shaded reaction function of the public bank 푅퐹0 whereas
the private bank’s reaction function 푅퐹1 is unaﬀected. The equilibrium point 푂 under
휃 = 1 lies North-West of point 푀 . This indicates that full nationalisation leads to lower
deposit collected by the public bank but higher deposit collected by the private bank.
Figure 3 shows how it is the reverse when the probability of default is below the critical
level. In this case, point 푂 lies South-East of point 푀 i.e. the public bank’s deposit level
rises while the private bank’s deposit level falls which is similar to what was observed in
the case of unlimited liability. In both these ﬁgures, as before, points 푁 denote the case
of 휃 = 0.
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Figure 2: Deposit reaction functions: limited liability and high default risk
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Figure 3: Deposit reaction functions: limited liability and low default risk
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